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Beginning with its decision in Furman v. Georgia, the United States 
Supreme Court has required states to narrow the class of individuals who 
may be sentenced to death.1  The primary impetus behind its 
jurisprudence in this field has been the need to ensure that states comply 
with the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
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 1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 




and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  While at 
the surface level its jurisprudence seems consistent with these needs, the 
rules that have evolved are quite open to criticism when applied in 
specific cases. 
A particularly troubling area of death penalty law deals with the not 
uncommon scenario wherein a state trial court sentences a defendant to 
death partially based on factors that are later deemed invalid.3  Does the 
subsequent invalidation of those factors render the death sentence 
unconstitutional?  While one might suppose that a person could not be 
sentenced to death based on invalid factors, the law is surprisingly 
complex and does not always comport with common sense.  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown v. Sanders is a case in 
point4—although the Court’s opinion ostensibly provides a bright-line 
rule to govern these situations, it is far from obvious that the Court got it 
right. 
In holding constitutional a California jury’s imposition of a death 
sentence partially based on subsequently invalidated sentencing factors,5 
the Sanders majority propounded a new rule.6  In essence, the rule 
operates as follows: So long as the underlying evidence implicated by an 
invalid sentencing factor was properly considered by the jury under 
some other, valid factor, a death sentence rendered thereby is prima facie  
constitutional.7
This Note analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in Sanders in 
an attempt to determine which Justice, if any, offers a satisfying solution 
 2. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (explaining the issue as “whether the imposition and execution of the 
death penalty constitutes ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment”); id. at 240-42 (stating that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to observe the Eighth Amendment); H. Mitchell 
Caldwell & Daryl Fisher-Ogden, Stalking the Jets and the Sharks: Exploring the 
Constitutionality of the Gang Death Penalty Enhancer, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 601, 
607-12 (2004) (describing the rationale of Furman and progeny). 
 3. The frequency with which these situations arise is higher than one might think.  
The Supreme Court alone has dealt with twelve such cases: Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 
884 (2006); Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 
(1992); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992); 
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991); Reeves v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 964 (1990); 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 
(1988); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 
(1983); and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); see also Joseph L. Hoffman, 
Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: Why Federal Habeas Courts Should Review 
the Merits of Every Death Sentence, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1783-84 (2000) (describing 
this as a “recurring situation”). 
 4. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 884. 
 5. Id. at 894. 
 6. Id. at 892. 
 7. Id. 
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to the problem of death sentences partially based on subsequently 
invalidated factors.  It argues that, while the dissenting opinions leave 
something to be desired, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is unacceptable 
because it treats too lightly the real possibility that a jury may choose 
death due to the role played by a subsequently invalidated sentencing 
factor.  In response, this Note offers an alternate approach—one that would 
accommodate the needs of judicial economy while simultaneously 
protecting against the substantial risks that Scalia erroneously ignores.8
Part II begins by setting forth the basic contours of the Supreme 
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence in this area prior to Sanders.  Next, 
Part III reviews the litigation leading up to the High Court’s opinion in 
this case.  Part III then continues by summarizing the contents of the 
three Sanders opinions representing the Justices’ divergent views on the 
law in this area.  Finally, Part IV analyzes the legitimacy of the Court’s 
opinion and recommends the aforementioned alternative approach. 
II.  BACKGROUND LAW 
A.  The Rule of Furman v. Georgia and The Weighing–Non-                 
Weighing Dichotomy 
Beginning with Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has held that 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
compels states to narrow the class of murderers upon which the death 
penalty may be imposed.9  This requirement is generally satisfied when 
the jury determines that there is something particularly heinous about the 
defendant’s conduct “according to an objective legislative definition.”10  
 8. As explained in more detail infra Part IV, this Note recommends the Court 
adopt the following rule: When a death sentence is reached based to some degree on a 
subsequently invalidated eligibility factor, the sentence must be vacated as 
unconstitutional unless  reliance on the invalidated factor is shown to be harmless error. 
 9. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (holding that execution of three defendants 
convicted of murder, rape, and rape, respectively, would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 
at 889 (“Since Furman v. Georgia, we have required States to limit the class of 
murderers to which the death penalty may be applied.”); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (“To avoid this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance 
must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must 
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared 
to others found guilty of murder.”). 
 10. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988). 




The purpose of this narrowing requirement is twofold: (1) to guide the 
jury’s discretion, thus guarding against an “arbitrary and capricious” 
decision to sentence the defendant to death; and (2) to ensure that only 
the most egregious of criminals receive the awful punishment of death.11
In the main, the various states have developed a two stage sentencing 
process to comply with the Furman narrowing requirement.12  In the first 
stage, the “eligibility stage,” the jury determines whether the defendant 
is eligible for the death penalty.13  In the second stage, the “penalty 
stage,” which is reached only if the jury has found the defendant eligible 
for death, the jury decides whether the defendant will in fact receive 
such punishment.14  At the penalty stage, however, states differ as to 
their approach.15
On the one hand, some states, known as “weighing states,” instruct the 
jury to consider any and all mitigating factors and weigh them against 
the specific aggravating factors that the jury found made the defendant 
eligible for the death penalty at the eligibility stage.16  On the other hand, 
some states, known as “non-weighing states,” require the jury weigh any 
and all mitigating factors against a set of aggravating factors that may or 
 11. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 876-77 & nn.14-15 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 206-07, 222 (1976)); see also Randall K. Packer, Struck by Lightning: The 
Elevation of Procedural Form over Substantive Rationality in Capital Sentencing 
Proceedings, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 649 (1994) (discussing the 
rationale underlying the Furman narrowing requirement). 
 12. See Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 896 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Death penalty 
proceedings take place in two stages.”); Adam Hine, Life or Death Mistakes: Cultural 
Stereotyping, Capital Punishment, and Regional Race-Based Trends in Exoneration and 
Wrongful Execution, 82 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 181, 186 n.29 (2005) (“In order to reduce 
the arbitrariness that existed in the imposition of capital punishment prior to Furman, 
most state death penalty statutes now bifurcate all capital trials into two phases . . . .”). 
 13. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 896. 
 14. Id. at 897.  To better understand how the prototypical two stage death 
sentencing process works, it is helpful to consider the trial court proceedings in Sanders.  
In convicting Sanders of first degree murder, the jury found four “special 
circumstances,” each of which independently made Sanders eligible for the death 
penalty.  Id. at 888.  This was the eligibility stage.  Then, having determined that Sanders 
was eligible for death, the trial moved into the penalty stage.  Id.  There, the jury 
weighed a list of aggravating factors (which happened to include “any special 
circumstances [that is, eligibility factors] found to be true”) against various mitigating 
factors to determine whether Sanders would in fact receive the death penalty.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 897. 
 16. Id.. at 889-90. However, disagreement over the true definitions of the terms 
“weighing” and “non-weighing” must be noted.  See, e.g., id. at 894-95 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (discussed infra Part III.C).  Nevertheless, the definition set forth above seems to 
represent the most common understanding of “weighing.”  Moreover, these terms, as 
opposed to the underlying concepts, did not appear in the Court’s jurisprudence until 
1990 (in the case of weighing states) and 1992 (in the case of non-weighing states).  
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) (discussing weighing states); Stringer 
v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1992) (discussing non-weighing states).   
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may not include the factors making the defendant eligible for death, but 
which, in the event that such aggravating factors do include the 
eligibility factors, are not limited to them.17  While it may appear trivial 
at first blush, this weighing–non-weighing dichotomy took on much 
significance through the Supreme Court’s case law and served as the 
sticking point between the Justices in Sanders.  
B.  The Genesis and Evolution of the Weighing–Non-                          
Weighing Dichotomy 
The weighing–non-weighing dichotomy was developed through two 
principal Supreme Court cases: Zant v. Stephens and Clemons v. 
Mississippi.18  Despite the relatively clear framework established by 
Zant and Clemons, the Court has always been sharply divided as to the 
legal ramifications that should attend a state’s use of a weighing versus 
non-weighing sentencing structure.19
 17. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 890.  The above reflects Justice Scalia’s definition of 
“non-weighing,” which, though not universally accepted, is again reflective of the 
dominant understanding.  But see id. at 894-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that 
in a non-weighing state the “sole function” of an eligibility factor is to make the 
defendant eligible for death; it is entirely excluded from the penalty phase).  One more 
dynamic to note is that the terms weighing and non-weighing are somewhat misleading.  
See id. at 897-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the terms could be clearer).  In 
both weighing and non-weighing states, the sentencer engages in a weighing process, 
balancing mitigating factors against aggravating factors to determine whether death is 
warranted.  See id. at 889-90 (“[W]e have held that in all capital cases the sentencer must 
be allowed to weigh the facts and circumstances that arguably justify a death sentence 
against the defendant’s mitigating evidence.”) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 110 (1982)).  Thus, the distinction lies not in whether weighing occurs, but in what 
is weighed.  Nevertheless, because these terms are used by the Court in Sanders and are 
central to its opinion, this Note likewise uses them. 
 18. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 
(1990).  It should also be noted that Stringer v. Black is rightly counted as one of the key 
Supreme Court cases dealing with this matter.  Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992).  
However, because the Court erected its weighing–non-weighing jurisprudence through 
Zant and Clemons, whereas it only further explained and built upon this jurisprudence in 
Stringer, this Note focuses more heavily on Zant and Clemons. 
 19. In Zant, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which four other 
Justices joined.  Zant, 462 U.S. at 862.  Justice White filed a separate opinion concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment.  Id. at 891-93 (White, J., concurring).  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.  Id. at 893-904 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, issued a 
lengthy dissent.  Id. at 904-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  In Clemons, the Court divided 
even more decisively.  Justice White issued the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Clemons, 494 U.S. at 740-55.  
Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Id. at 




In Zant, the Court addressed the question of whether, in the context of 
Georgia’s non-weighing regime, the invalidation of an eligibility factor 
subsequent to the jury’s selection of the death sentence produced a 
constitutional defect.20  Justice Stevens, speaking for the five-member 
majority,21 held it did not.22  While acknowledging the settled doctrine 
that the categorically unique stakes involved in capital decisions 
correspond to a greater need for reliability,23 the Court reasoned that 
Georgia’s non-weighing status24 eliminated any real concern of 
755-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Blackmun 
dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.  Id. at 756-74 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  In Stringer, the Court’s other principal opinion on the 
weighing–non-weighing dichotomy, the Justices split as follows: Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion, in which Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor joined; 
Souter filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by Scalia and Thomas.  Stringer, 503 
U.S. at 224. 
 20. Zant, 462 U.S. at 864 (“The question presented is whether respondent’s death 
penalty must be vacated because one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances 
[that is, eligibility factors] found by the jury was subsequently held to be invalid . . . .  
The answer depends on the function of the jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance 
under Georgia’s capital sentencing statute . . . .”). 
 21. Id.  The reader should take special note of the fact that Justice Stevens 
authored the majority opinion in Zant; his dissenting opinion in Sanders is arguably 
inconsistent with his opinion in Zant.  See Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 894 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 22. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890-91. 
 23. Id. at 884-85.  Specifically, Justice Stevens remarked: “[B]ecause there is a 
qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, 
‘there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’”  Id. (quoting Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).  But see John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: 
Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1992-93 
(2005) (explaining that Supreme Court death penalty precedent, at least in regard to the 
Sixth Amendment, “is not so different after all”). 
 24. In truth, the Court had not yet adopted the terms weighing and non-weighing to 
describe death penalty schemes at the time of the Zant decision.  See supra note 16.  
However, as the term has come to be understood (and indeed as Zant has been 
interpreted in retrospect), Georgia undoubtedly had a non-weighing system.  See, e.g., 
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s 
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 
357 n.93 (1998) (“Zant involved a state with a ‘nonweighing’ statute.”); Janet & Robert 
Morrow, In a Narrow Grave: Texas Punishment Law in Capital Cases, 43 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 979, 1003 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens upheld the death 
sentence from Georgia—a non-weighing state . . . .”).   The Georgia scheme operated as 
follows: At the eligibility stage, the factfinder was required to find at least one of ten 
statutorily defined aggravating circumstances.  Zant, 462 U.S. at 870-71, 875 n.13.  If it 
did so, the proceedings moved to the penalty phase wherein the factfinder would decide 
whether to actually impose the death sentence.  Id. at 871.  In making this determination, 
the factfinder would consider “‘all evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation 
of punishment.’”  Id. (quoting the Georgia Supreme Court’s response to the United 
States Supreme Court’s certified question requesting explanation of the Georgia death 
penalty sentencing scheme).  Thus, although consideration of the eligibility findings was 
not excluded at the penalty stage, the factfinder was not instructed to give the eligibility 
findings any particular weight when coming to its sentencing decision.  Id. at 889 n.25. 
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prejudicial error.25  Specifically, because the evidence implicated by the 
invalidated eligibility factor—that the defendant had a “substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions”26—was nevertheless 
properly considered by the jury under a different rubric at the sentencing 
phase,27 the Court reasoned that “any possible impact cannot fairly be 
regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process.”28
On the surface, the Court’s reasoning for upholding the death sentence 
in Zant seems strikingly similar to the logic of the rule promulgated by 
Justice Scalia in Sanders: Both opinions appear to hold the sentences 
constitutional because the evidence implicated by the invalidated factors 
was properly considered by the jury under another, valid factor.  
However, as the dissenting Justices in Sanders were quick to note, there 
is reason to think that the Zant rationale was significantly different.  
Specifically, it is arguable that the Court in Zant did not assume any 
error was harmless, but rather found the error to be harmless based on its 
review of the record. 29
 25. Id. at 884-91.  In particular, the Court emphasized two characteristics of the 
Georgia sentencing scheme as significant to the conclusion that the defendant suffered 
no real prejudice: (1) the “underlying evidence” implicated by the invalidated eligibility 
factor was “nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase”; and (2) if the jury did 
place any greater emphasis at the penalty stage on its finding of the invalidated factor, it 
was “merely a consequence of the statutory label ‘aggravating circumstance.’”  Id. at 
886, 888. 
 26. Id. at 867. 
 27. Id. at 886-88. 
 28. Id. at 889. 
 29. See Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 900-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In particular, Justice 
Breyer describes the import of Zant as follows: 
[In Zant,] the Court concluded that, under the circumstances, the error was 
harmless. . . .  The Court in Zant did not say that the jury’s consideration of an 
improper aggravator is never harmless in a State like Georgia.  It did say that 
the jury’s consideration of the improper aggravator was harmless under the 
circumstances of that case.  And the Court’s detailed discussion [in Zant] of 
the jury instructions is inconsistent with a rule of law that would require an 
automatic conclusion of “harmless error” in States with death penalty laws like 
Georgia’s. 
Id.  Though it is not entirely clear, many of the Court’s statements in Zant do suggest 
that it upheld the death sentence because, upon review and given Georgia’s sentencing 
structure, the error that occurred appeared harmless.  See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 889-90 
(agreeing with the Georgia Supreme Court that the error had “an inconsequential impact 
on the jury’s decision regarding the death penalty”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
If this is indeed what occurred in Zant, then Scalia’s approach in Sanders marks a 
categorical departure from precedent: Scalia expressly states that, if a death sentence 
passes muster under his new rule, it is prima facie constitutional, and though error 
obviously occurred, there is no need for harmless error review.  Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 




The second major Supreme Court case discussing the weighing–non-
weighing dichotomy is Clemons.30  In contrast to Georgia’s sentencing 
regime in Zant, Mississippi used the weighing model.31  Under this 
system, if the defendant was convicted of murder, the jury would be 
instructed that the defendant would be eligible for death if it found at 
least one aggravating circumstance.32  Then, having found the defendant 
eligible, the jury would specifically weigh whatever aggravating 
circumstances, that is, eligibility factors, it found against any applicable 
mitigating circumstances to arrive at its sentencing decision.33  
Therefore, to use the imagery of a scale, one side—the side militating in 
favor of death—would be weighed down exclusively by whatever 
eligibility factors the jury had found; the other side—the side pointing 
towards imprisonment—would be weighed down by the relevant 
statutorily prescribed mitigating circumstances.34  Under this approach, 
if an eligibility factor were subsequently invalidated, the weighing 
process would necessarily be improperly skewed in favor of death 
because the invalidated factor would have acted as an illegitimate 
aggravator.35
Acknowledging as much and facing this situation, the Court in 
Clemons vacated the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision upholding 
892.  In other words, if Breyer is right, then Zant supports the notion of traditional 
harmless error review in these situations, while Scalia’s approach in Sanders allows the 
court to automatically assume the error was harmless. 
 30. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). 
 31. Although the Court did not expressly label Mississippi a “weighing” state, it 
did use this term in discussing the significance of Mississippi’s sentencing regime to the 
outcome of the case.  Id. at 748-49, 752 (“An automatic rule of affirmance in a weighing 
State [like Mississippi] would be invalid . . . .”).  More importantly, as the concept is 
generally understood, Mississippi undoubtedly used a weighing scheme.  See id. at 742-
43.  Finally, the scheme at issue in Clemons has since been cited by the Court as being a 
classic example of a weighing system.  See, e.g., Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 891 n.3 
(“Clemons maintains the distinction envisioned in Zant between Georgia (a non-
weighing State) and Mississippi (a weighing State) . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 32. Unlike the more common system of bifurcating the eligibility and sentencing 
processes into two distinct stages, the Mississippi regime in Clemons collapsed these two 
stages into one.  Clemons, 494 U.S. at 742-43.  That is, at the sentencing hearing, the 
jury was instructed that it could only consider a short list of prescribed aggravating 
factors as justifying the death sentence (that is, making the defendant eligible for death).  
At the same time, the jury was to weigh any aggravating factors it found against any 
mitigating circumstances to determine whether to in fact impose the death sentence.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 745 n.2.  In addition, the jury members were instructed several times 
that, “‘regardless of aggravating circumstances, they were not required to impose the 
death penalty.’”  Id. at 744 (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1364 
(1988)). 
 34. Id. at 745 n.2. 
 35. See id. at 750-53 (holding that, given Mississippi’s weighing regime, the jury’s 
consideration of invalid eligibility factors required harmless error review or a reweighing 
of the valid factors to ensure the defendant would still have received the death sentence 
without the invalid factors). 
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the defendant’s death sentence wherein the jury had relied on a 
constitutionally invalid eligibility factor to arrive at its sentence.36  
Significantly, the Court did not vacate the death sentence itself.37  
Rather, it remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court with 
instructions to either: (a) conduct harmless error review to determine 
whether the jury would have chosen death in the absence of the 
invalidated factor; or (b) independently reweigh the remaining valid 
eligibility factor against the mitigating evidence to discern whether the 
death sentence was appropriate.38  Thus, the message of Clemons was 
clear: Unlike the case of a non-weighing state, there was strong reason to 
believe that in a weighing state a jury might have opted for a sentence of 
imprisonment but for the role played by an invalidated eligibility factor. 
Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Zant and Clemons erected the 
weighing–non-weighing dichotomy.  For the moment the law seemed, if 
not universally accepted, relatively clear.39  Nevertheless, the critiques of 
 36. Id. at 755. 
 37. Id. at 754-55 & n.5. 
 38. Id. at 750-55.  This approach makes sense in a weighing regime because, even 
though in such a system the jury’s consideration of an invalid factor necessarily skews 
the sentencing process in favor of death, the jury may have chosen death had they not 
considered the invalid factor.  In other words, the error may be harmless.  Clemons is 
also significant for its holding that an appellate court may cure this sort of constitutional 
error not only through the traditional means of harmless error review, but also by 
independently reweighing the remaining valid sentencing factors to determine if death is 
appropriate. Id. at 744-50; Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 138 n.189 (2002).  In coming to this conclusion, the Court 
roundly rejected the contention that the Sixth Amendment allows only the jury to engage 
in such a reweighing.  Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745.  Still, the reader may wonder why the 
Court in Clemons did not acknowledge that the jury, rather than the appellate court, 
could engage in reweighing the valid factors on remand.  The reason is that, under 
Mississippi law, the reweighing task had been designated as an appellate function.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made it clear that such reweighing could legitimately 
be performed by a jury, but that such decision was for the state appellate court to make: 
Nothing in this opinion is intended to convey the impression that state 
appellate courts are required to or necessarily should engage in reweighing or 
harmless-error analysis when errors have occurred in a capital sentencing 
proceeding.  Our holding is only that such procedures are constitutionally 
permissible.  In some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that 
peculiarities in a case make appellate reweighing or harmless-error analysis 
extremely speculative or impossible.  We have previously noted that appellate 
courts may face certain difficulties in determining sentencing questions in the 
first instance.  Nevertheless, that decision is for state appellate courts, 
including the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case, to make. 
  Id. at 754 (citation omitted). 
 39. However, despite the relative clarity of the framework established by Zant and 
Clemons, the Court created some confusion with its decision in Stringer one year later.   




the Zant-Clemons jurisprudence were compelling,40 and the Court’s 
framework would be given the ultimate test in Sanders. 
III. BROWN  V. SANDERS 
A.  Factual and Procedural History 
After invading Dale Boender’s home, Ronald Sanders and a 
companion bound and blindfolded Boender and his girlfriend, Janice 
Allen.41  The two victims were then struck on the head with a blunt, 
heavy object, and Allen died from the attack.42
At trial, Sanders was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of 
Allen, attempted murder of Boender, robbery, burglary, and attempted 
robbery.43  In addition, the jury found that four “special circumstances,” 
that is, eligibility factors, attended the murder, each of which 
independently made Sanders eligible for death.44  At the penalty stage, 
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992).  Specifically, the Court in Stringer made 
statements confirming the importance of the weighing–non-weighing dichotomy, while 
also making statements that cast doubt on whether different rules applied in such regimes 
when a defendant was sentenced to death based on subsequently invalidated factors.  For 
instance, on one hand, the Court remarked: 
With respect to the function of a state reviewing court in determining whether 
the sentence can be upheld despite the use of an improper aggravating factor, 
the difference between a weighing State and a non-weighing State is not one of 
“semantics,” as the Court of Appeals thought, but of critical importance. 
Id. at 231-32 (citation omitted).  On the other hand, some of the Court’s statements 
seemed to suggest that a universal rule (entailing something like harmless error review) 
applied in both weighing and non-weighing States: “In order for a state appellate court to 
affirm a death sentence after the sentencer was instructed to consider an invalid factor, 
the court must determine what the sentencer would have done absent the factor.”  Id. at 
230. 
 40. See, e.g., David McCord, Is Death “Different” for Purposes of Harmless Error 
Analysis?  Should It Be?: An Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Court 
Case Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1153-57 (1999) (arguing that the Court’s jurisprudence 
in both Zant and Clemons is fundamentally flawed in that neither decision sufficiently 
ensures reliability in death penalty cases); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 387 n.153 (1995) (questioning the legitimacy of the 
different rules that apply to weighing versus non-weighing states); Stephen Hornbuckle, 
Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court’s Caselaw, 
73 TEX. L. REV. 441, 454-57 (1994) (criticizing Zant in particular on the grounds that it 
flies in the face of the traditional policy of requiring heightened reliability in capital 
decisions and that it ignores the extent to which a jury might rely on an invalidated 
factor). 
 41. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 888 (2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (Deering 1990) (listing the “special 
circumstances,” each of which independently rendered a defendant eligible for the death 
penalty at the time Sanders was sentenced). 
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the court instructed the jury to consider a separate list of sentencing 
factors to guide its discretion in deciding whether to in fact impose the 
death penalty.45  One of these considerations was “[t]he circumstances of 
the crime of which the defendant was convicted . . . and the existence of 
any special circumstances found to be true.”46  In other words, the jury 
was instructed to take into account the fact that it had found Sanders 
eligible for death four times over.47  In the end, the jury sentenced 
Sanders to death.48
On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated two of the 
“special circumstances” found by the jury: (1) that “[t]he murder was 
committed while the defendant was engaged in . . . [b]urglary”; and (2) 
that it was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”49  However, as each 
“special circumstance” independently rendered Sanders eligible for the 
death penalty,50 the California Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the 
sentence.51  In doing so it relied largely on the authority of Zant.52
After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Sanders filed 
a habeas petition in federal district court, contending that the jury’s 
 45. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 888; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999) 
(listing the factors to be considered by the jury at the penalty stage).  It should be noted 
that, while section 190.3 limited the jury’s discretion by listing only eleven distinct 
factors to be considered by the jury in making its penalty decision, it nevertheless 
allowed any evidence, subject to a few minor exceptions, to be presented by either the 
people or the defendant “as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and 
sentence . . . .”  Id. 
 46. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 888 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, the sentencing 
factor relating to “the existence of any special circumstances found to be true” is the first 
factor listed in section 190.3.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a).  It is therefore clear that the 
legislature considered this to be a significant factor, undermining somewhat the 
argument that the jury’s consideration of invalid “special circumstances” is, or was 
meant to be, inconsequential to its determination of whether to impose death. 
 47. Of course, section 190.3 did not explicitly instruct the jury to consider that it 
had found the defendant eligible for death, or that it had done so by a large margin.  
Nevertheless, by instructing the jury to take into account “the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true,” it seems reasonable to suppose that many jurors would 
put two and two together: many jurors would justifiably think, “the more eligibility 
factors we found, the more the defendant deserves death.”  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.3(a).  
 48. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 888. 
 49. People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 587, 589 (Cal. 1990); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.2(a)(14), (17)(vii) (Deering 1990). 
 50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2. 
 51. Sanders, 797 P.2d at 589. 
 52. Id. (holding Zant controlling because, according to the United States Supreme 
Court, Zant “upheld a death penalty judgment despite invalidation of one of several 
aggravating factors”). 




weighing of the invalid factors at the penalty stage was a defect of 
constitutional proportions.53  The district court denied relief, but the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.54  In particular, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the California Supreme Court had “erroneously 
believed it could apply the rule of Zant v. Stephens, which is applicable 
only to non-weighing states,” to uphold the death sentence.55  In the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, California was a weighing state.56  Therefore, 
relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s language in Clemons and Stringer, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that due to 
California’s weighing scheme the death sentence could only be upheld if 
it survived harmless error review or an independent reweighing sans the 
invalid sentencing factors.57  Five Justices on the United States Supreme 
Court disagreed.58
 53. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 888-89.  As Justice Scalia noted, because Sanders filed 
his habeas petition prior to April 24, 1996, the Supreme Court did not apply the 
deferential standard of review required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA).  Id. at 889 n.1; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2002).  Under AEDPA, a federal 
court cannot grant habeas relief to a person imprisoned by a state court unless the state 
court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Had this provision been applicable to Sanders’s claim, it is 
reasonably likely that the Supreme Court would have reversed the Ninth Circuit (and 
hence affirmed Sanders’s death sentence) based exclusively on AEDPA’s deferential 
standard of review. 
 54. Sanders v. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 55. Id. at 1064 (citation omitted). 
 56. Id.  According to the Ninth Circuit, non-weighing states are those in which 
“aggravating factors  matter for determining eligibility . . . , but have no specific function 
in the sentencing process [the penalty stage] itself.”  Id. at 1059.  Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit believed, the invalidation of an eligibility factor in a non-weighing state did not 
render a death sentence based on such factor unconstitutional because, so long as another 
valid eligibility factor was found, the defendant would still be eligible for death and the 
invalid factor would not infect the weighing process at the penalty stage.  Id.  In contrast, 
in weighing states ‘“the finding of aggravating factors [eligibility factors] is part of the 
jury’s sentencing determination, and the jury is required to weigh any mitigating factors 
against the aggravating circumstances [including the relevant eligibility factors].’”  Id. 
(quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)).  In other words, according 
to the Ninth Circuit’s definitions of the schemes, if eligibility factors play any role in the 
penalty stage, then it is a weighing regime.  Id at 1059.  With this in mind, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that California was clearly a weighing state and therefore Sanders’s 
death sentence, based as it was on two subsequently invalidated eligibility factors, was 
prima facie unconstitutional.  Id. at 1060, 1064. 
 57. Id. at 1064. 
 58. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 887-88.  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court 
reversing the Ninth Circuit; he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Id.  Sanders was the Roberts Court’s first five-to-
four decision.  Linda Greenhouse, A 1986 Case Could Aid Appeals Along Death Row, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2006, at A18. 
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B.  Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion 
In announcing the Court’s opinion in Sanders, Justice Scalia set forth 
a compelling analysis which would be logically sound, but for that it 
rests on a false factual premise.  Specifically, to make his rule work, 
Justice Scalia erroneously assumed that a jury’s consideration of an 
invalid sentencing factor is essentially inconsequential in a broad range 
of cases.59  Not only was this a serious factual mistake, but it also 
conflicts with the Court’s longstanding recognition that the categorically 
unique stakes involved in death penalty decisions mandate “a corresponding 
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case.”60  Moreover, while Scalia’s 
opinion purported to transcend the weighing–non-weighing dichotomy,61 
his new rule hinges on the distinction: It only applies to non-weighing 
states.62
Scalia’s analysis began with a description of the weighing–non-
weighing dichotomy and its development through Supreme Court case 
law.63  Simultaneously, however, Scalia cast doubt on the continued 
validity of the distinction, questioning its actual usefulness.64  
Nevertheless, he did seem ultimately to affirm at least one facet of the 
Court’s prior jurisprudence—the notion that, in an extreme or pure 
weighing state,65 the subsequent invalidation of an eligibility factor 
 59. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 892 (“[S]uch skewing will occur, and give rise to 
constitutional error, only where the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the 
same facts and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor.”). 
 60. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
 61. See, e.g., Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 891 (“This weighing/non-weighing scheme is 
accurate as far as it goes, but it now seems to us needlessly complex and incapable of 
providing for the full range of possible variations.”). 
 62. Id. at 892 (“We think it will clarify the analysis, and simplify the sentence-
invalidating factors we have hitherto applied to non-weighing States if we are henceforth 
guided by the following rule . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 63. See id. at 889-91.  This portion of the opinion largely mirrors Part II of this Note. 
 64. See supra note 61.  Nevertheless, while Justice Scalia implied a number of 
times that the weighing–non-weighing distinction is no more, he still used the dichotomy 
to support his conclusion.  See, e.g., Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 890 n.3 (noting with approval 
that “the Courts of Appeals have uniformly understood that different rules apply to 
weighing and non-weighing states, and that harmless error review is only necessary in 
the former”).  In other words, Scalia criticized the distinction on the whole when it was 
not helpful to him, but then relied on it when it aided his cause.  This inconsistency 
further undermined the persuasiveness of his opinion. 
 65. That is, a state wherein the only factors that may be considered as aggravating 
at the penalty stage are those factors which were found to make the defendant eligible for 
death at the eligibility stage. 




necessarily skews the weighing process in favor of death, requiring 
harmless error review or independent reweighing to avoid unconstitutionality. 66
As to non-weighing states, however, Justice Scalia announced a new 
rule: 
An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will 
render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper 
element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one of the other 
sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same 
facts and circumstances.67
After announcing this rule, Scalia proceeded to classify California as a 
non-weighing state, contradicting the Ninth Circuit’s finding.68  In doing 
so, Scalia applied a common, though not universally accepted,69 
understanding of what makes a state weighing versus non-weighing.70  
He defined weighing states as “those in which the only aggravating 
factors permitted to be considered by the sentencer [are] the eligibility 
factors,”71 and non-weighing states as those “that permit[] the sentencer 
to consider aggravating factors different from, or in addition to, the 
eligibility factors.”72  Under this rubric, he declared California a non-
weighing state because, at the penalty stage, the jury considers a set of 
aggravating factors that incorporates the eligibility factors73 but which 
also contains a series of other, distinct considerations.74
 66. Id. at 890 (“In a weighing State, therefore, the sentencer’s consideration of an 
invalid eligibility factor necessarily skew[s] its balancing of aggravators with mitigators, 
and require[s] reversal of the sentence (unless a state appellate court determine[s] the 
error was harmless or reweigh[s] the mitigating evidence against the valid aggravating 
factors).”). 
 67. Id. at 892.  Again, depending on how one reads Zant, this new rule could either 
be characterized as merely a clarification and slight extension of precedent, or as a major 
departure.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  In addition, as Justice Stevens 
pointed out in his Sanders dissent, it appears that two weeks after Zant, the Supreme 
Court characterized Zant as applying harmless error review rather than an automatic rule 
resulting in a finding of constitutionality.  Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 901 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion)); Barclay, 
463 U.S. at 951 n.8 (holding a death sentence constitutional and concluding that “we 
need not apply the type of federal harmless-error analysis that was necessary in Zant”). 
 68. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 893 (holding that the sentencing scheme “caus[es] 
California to be (in our prior terminology) a non-weighing State”). 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 894-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in a non-
weighing state, the sole function of an eligibility factor is to render the defendant eligible 
for death); accord Sanders v. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 70. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 889-91. 
 71. Id. at 890. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 893.  The jury considers “the existence of any special circumstances 
[eligibility factors] found to be true . . . .”  CAL. PENAL CODE  § 190.3(a). 
 74. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 893.  Section 190.3 directs the jury to consider ten other 
factors (in addition to the presence of any eligibility factors) when discerning whether to 
impose the death penalty.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3. 
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Then, having found California to be a non-weighing state, Scalia 
applied his new rule to Sanders’s appeal.75  He reasoned that because the 
invalidated eligibility factors (for example, that the murder was 
committed in the course of a burglary and that it was “especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel”76) only implicated facts and circumstances 
properly considered by the jury under another, valid aggravating factor 
at the penalty phase, Sanders’s death sentence was constitutionally 
sound.77  What made this all possible was the fact that, under California’s 
death penalty scheme, the jury was instructed to consider an “omnibus 
‘circumstances of the crime’ sentencing factor.”78  This valid sentencing 
factor thus allowed the jury to consider as aggravating the identical facts 
and circumstances which underlie the burglary-murder and “especially 
heinous” factors.79  Invalidation of the latter two was therefore, in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion, inconsequential:  The predicate facts and circumstances 
were “properly considered whether or not they bore upon the invalidated 
eligibility factors.”80
Furthermore, in upholding Sanders’s death sentence Scalia gave little 
credence to a rather convincing argument advanced by both Sanders and 
Justice Stevens in dissent: the possibility that the jury would “coun[t] the 
nature of the crime twice” (once under the “circumstances of the crime” 
omnibus factor and again under the invalidated eligibility factors),81 or 
that it would regard the legislature’s decision that the invalidated factors 
made one eligible for death as an “imprimatur on the decision to impose 
 75. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 893. 
 76. Id. at 893-94.  The California Supreme Court invalidated the burglary-murder 
eligibility factor under state merger law because it allowed the jury to find a burglary 
(and hence the burglary-murder eligibility factor) based on Sanders’s intent to commit an 
assault, which is already an element of homicide.  People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 587 
(Cal. 1990).  As to the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” eligibility factor, the 
California Supreme Court struck this down as unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 589. 
 77. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 894. 
 78. Id.  Specifically, Scalia reasoned as follows: 
[T]he jury’s consideration of the invalid eligibility factors in the weighing 
process [the penalty stage] did not produce constitutional error because all of 
the facts and circumstances admissible to establish the “heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel” and burglary-murder eligibility factors were also properly adduced as 
aggravating facts bearing upon the ‘circumstances of the crime’ sentencing 
factor. 
Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id 
 81. Id. at 895 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 




death and therefore give greater weight” to such factors.82  In Scalia’s 
mind, if this were a possibility, it did not rise to the level of a 
“constitutional defect.”83
C.  Justice Stevens’s Dissent 
According to Justice Stevens, the majority’s conception of what 
makes a state weighing versus non-weighing is critically flawed.  He 
argued that the Court’s “prior cases have drawn a simple categorical 
distinction” between such regimes.84  In a non-weighing state, those 
factors which make the defendant eligible for death are absolutely 
uninvolved in the penalty stage.85  Alternatively, if the eligibility factors 
play any role in the decision whether to actually impose death, then it is 
ipso facto a weighing state.86
Having framed the distinction thus, Stevens concluded that the 
Ninth Circuit correctly found California to be a weighing state,87 and 
that because of this, it also correctly declared Sanders’s sentence 
unconstitutional.88  Specifically, under Stevens’s definition of a weighing 
 82. Id.  According to Scalia, the Court addressed these very concerns in Zant and 
concluded that they were without merit.  See id. at 894.  In particular, Scalia rebuffed 
these contentions as follows: 
Sanders argues that the weighing process was skewed by the fact that the jury 
was asked to consider, as one of the sentencing factors, “the existence of any 
special circumstances [eligibility factors] found to be true.”  In Sanders’ view, 
that placed special emphasis upon those facts and circumstances relevant to the 
invalid eligibility factor.  Virtually the same thing happened in Zant.  There the 
Georgia jury was permitted to “‘conside[r] all evidence in extenuation, 
mitigation and aggravation of punishment,’” but also instructed specifically 
that it could consider “‘any of [the] statutory aggravating circumstances which 
you find are supported by the evidence.’”  This instruction gave the facts 
underlying the eligibility factors special prominence.  Yet, even though one of 
the three factors (that the defendant had “substantial history of serious 
assaultive convictions”) was later invalidated, we upheld the sentence. We 
acknowledged that the erroneous instruction “might have caused the jury to 
give somewhat greater weight to respondent’s prior criminal record than it 
otherwise would have given”; indeed, we assumed such an effect.  But the 
effect was “merely a consequence of the statutory label ‘aggravating 
circumstanc[e].’”  We agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court that any such 
impact was “‘inconsequential,’” and held that it “cannot fairly be regarded as a 
constitutional defect in the sentencing process.”  The same is true here.
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 83. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 889 (1983)). 
 84. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 85. See id. at 894-95. 
 86. See id. at 895. 
 87. Id. at 896 (“[T]he court of appeals correctly decided that the statutory text [of 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3] unambiguously” rendered California a weighing state.). 
 88. See id. at 895-96 (noting that the Court’s decisions in Zant, Clemons, and 
Stringer dictate that in a weighing state a defendant’s death sentence must be vacated 
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state, California clearly falls into this category because at the penalty 
phase the jury was instructed to, among other things, weigh ‘“[t]he 
circumstances of the crime . . . and the existence of any [aggravating] 
circumstances [eligibility factors] found to be true.’”89  Therefore, when 
two of the four eligibility factors were invalidated, an improper “weight 
[was] added to death’s side of the scale, and one cannot presume that 
this weight made no difference to the jury’s ultimate conclusion.”90
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens further noted that within weighing  
regimes, there are differences in that some schemes place more emphasis 
on eligibility factors at the penalty stage than others.91  Therefore, within 
some weighing systems—those placing little emphasis on eligibility 
factors at the penalty stage—the likelihood that the defendant will be 
prejudiced by the jury’s consideration of an invalid eligibility factor is 
diminished.92  California, he suggested, falls within this camp: Because 
courts permit jurors to consider the same facts and circumstances 
implicated by the invalidated eligibility factors under the valid 
“circumstances of the crime” factor, this “increases the likelihood that 
their consideration of a subsequently invalidated aggravating circumstance 
[eligibility factor] will be harmless . . . .”93  Still, this dynamic “does not 
take California out of the ‘weighing state’ category.”94  In the end, then, 
Stevens would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Sanders’s death 
sentence was unconstitutionally imposed, and that it can only be cured 
on a showing that any error was harmless or through independent 
reweighing of the valid sentencing factors.95
unless the error is shown to be harmless or the sentence survives an independent 
reweighing of the valid factors). 
 89. Id. at 895 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a) (West 1999)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id.  Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote: 
There are, of course, different weighing systems. If a jury is told that only 
those specific aggravating circumstances making the defendant eligible for the 
death penalty may provide reasons for imposing that penalty, its consideration 
of an invalid factor is obviously more prejudicial than if the jury is told that it 
may also consider all of the circumstances of the crime. The fact that 
California sentencing juries may consider these circumstances increases the 
likelihood that their consideration of a subsequently invalidated aggravating 
circumstance will be harmless, but it does not take California out of the 
‘weighing State’ category. 
Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 896.  Significantly, Justice Stevens noted that had the Court been 




D.  Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
In contrast to Stevens’s dissent, Justice Breyer’s critique of the 
majority opinion stemmed from the premise that regardless of a state’s 
status as weighing or non-weighing, any time a jury renders a death 
sentence based on its consideration of an invalid sentencing factor, the 
sentence is prima facie unconstitutional.96  In other words, he would 
eviscerate the weighing–non-weighing distinction as “unrealistic, 
impractical, and legally unnecessary,”97 and adopt the simple rule that 
sentences such as Sanders’s are unconstitutional unless the error is 
shown to be harmless.98
More specifically, Breyer attacked Scalia’s opinion on the ground that 
it is inconsistent with precedent and “common sense” because it framed 
the issue on appeal as merely “a problem of the admissibility of certain 
evidence.”99  According to Justice Breyer, Scalia simply believed  
Sanders only suffered constitutional harm if the invalid eligibility factor 
allowed the jury to consider as aggravating at the penalty stage evidence 
which it otherwise would not have been permitted to weigh.100  
Precedent, said Breyer, is at odds with this approach: The Court’s key 
cases on the topic101 have not been concerned with the admissibility of 
evidence, but with the emphasis placed on such evidence by the jury 
improperly considering it as a factor which the state has deemed 
asked, he might have concluded that the error in Sanders’s case was harmless.  Id.  
However, because the petitioner, the State of California, merely asked the Court to 
decide whether California was a weighing or non-weighing State, Stevens refrained from 
addressing the issue.  Id.  In addition, Stevens criticized the majority opinion on the 
grounds that it will likely create confusion among the lower courts.  Id.  (“[T]his decision 
is more likely to complicate than to clarify our capital sentencing jurisprudence . . . .”).  
This angle of criticism may be unfounded.  In United States v. Hammer, the district court 
lucidly discussed the Sanders rule, and seemingly grasped its basic operation with no 
confusion whatsoever.  See United States v. Hammer, No. 4:CR-96-239, 2006 WL 
229057, slip op. at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. 2006). 
 96. See Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 896 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer put it 
bluntly: 
In my view, it does not matter whether California is a “weighing” or a 
“nonweighing” State, as ordinary rules of appellate review should apply.  A 
reviewing court must find that the jury’s consideration of an invalid aggravator 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the form a State’s death 
penalty law takes. 
Id. 
 97. Id. at 898. 
 98. See id. at 902. 
 99. Id. at 903. 
 100. Id. (“If all the evidence was properly admitted and if the jury can use that 
evidence when it considers other aggravating factors, any error, the Court announces, 
must be harmless.”). 
 101. Stinger v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 
(1990); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
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aggravating enough to make one eligible for death.102  In this sense, 
Breyer echoed the concern voiced by Stevens—that harmless error 
review is necessary out of fear that the jury may consider the state’s 
choice to classify a factor as rendering one death-eligible as a 
“legislative imprimatur on the decision to impose death . . . .”103
In a way, though, Breyer’s disagreement with the majority reflects a 
more profound difference of opinion over the degree of reliability 
needed in capital punishment cases.  In Breyer’s view, “‘given the acute 
need for reliable decision-making when the death penalty is at issue,’ 
reviewing courts should decide if [the] error was harmful, regardless of 
the form a State’s death penalty law takes.”104  Therefore, while Breyer 
was willing to acknowledge the possibility that the error was harmless in 
this case, he was not ready to assume it.105
IV.  WHICH JUSTICE, IF ANY, GOT IT RIGHT? 
Based on considerations of policy, precedent, and logic, none of the 
opinions in this case is perfect.106  That being said, while Scalia’s 
 102. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Common sense suggests, 
however, and this Court has explicitly held, that the problem before us is not a problem 
of the admissibility of certain evidence.  It is a problem of the emphasis given to that 
evidence by the State or the trial court.”). 
 103. Id. at 895 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Breyer noted that the “jury might do so 
because the judge or prosecutor led it to believe that state law attaches particular 
importance to that factor: Indeed, why else would the State call that factor an 
‘aggravator’ and/or permit it to render a defendant death eligible?”  Id. at 898 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 898 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 
2014 (2005)) (citation omitted). 
 105. Id. at 904. 
 106. Among other things, whether any of the Justices correctly defined the 
weighing–non-weighing framework is not clear.  Scalia and Breyer approached the 
matter as if there were a bright-line distinction between weighing and non-weighing 
schemes, when the framework is perhaps better understood not as a dichotomy, but as a 
continuum: on one end of the spectrum is the most extreme form of a weighing scheme; 
on the other end, the most extreme non-weighing scheme; and in between are regimes 
that share aspects of both frameworks.  Stevens came closest to acknowledging this idea 
by recognizing that not all weighing schemes pose the same risk of prejudice.  
Ultimately, though, none of the Justices’ constructions of the weighing–non-weighing 
framework is clearly right as a matter of precedent.  By the same token, none of their 
constructions is clearly wrong.  The precedent is, to a significant degree, ambiguous, and 
we see this play out in Sanders: all three opinions espoused different interpretations of 
the weighing–non-weighing dichotomy, and all three proclaimed them to be supported 
by the Court’s prior cases. 




opinion is clearly unacceptable, Breyer’s comes closest to providing a 
satisfactory solution. 
Justice Scalia’s approach to the issue in Sanders—whether the 
subsequent invalidation of an eligibility factor considered by a jury at 
the penalty stage renders a death sentence based thereon prima facie 
unconstitutional107—is critically flawed in two ways.  First, it incorrectly 
assumes that as long as a jury can consider the same facts and 
circumstances under some other, valid sentencing factor, the jury’s 
consideration of an invalid eligibility factor will not present enough of a 
risk of prejudice to justify harmless error review.108  This is simply 
counterfactual.  If a jury finds that a certain circumstance renders the 
defendant eligible for death, it is fallacious to assume that the jury will 
not place more weight on such circumstance at the penalty stage.  A jury 
might foreseeably do this by either counting that circumstance as doubly 
aggravating or by viewing it as particularly heinous given the state’s 
decision to deem it capable of making one eligible for the death 
penalty.109
Second, although it might be reasonable in another context to view 
this risk as insufficient to justify the judicial expense of harmless error 
review, it is unacceptable to do so in the qualitatively different context 
of capital punishment.  The Court has consistently held the tremendous 
stakes involved in death penalty decisions mandate a greater need for 
reliability,110 so while there may be a time and place to put a premium on 
 107. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 888. 
 108. Id. at 892; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 109. See G.M. Filisko, High Court ‘Weighs’ in on Death Penalty Verdicts: First 5-4 
Ruling of Roberts Era Shows a Court Reluctant to Budge on Capital Punishment, 5 
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT (2006) (“[T]he opinion [in Sanders] is ‘very troubling’ and it 
‘strongly suggests that . . . the majority’s understanding of how juries make decisions is 
untethered to reality’ . . . .”) (quoting Professor Elizabeth Semel, director of the Boalt 
Hall Death Penalty Clinic and former director of the American Bar Association’s Death 
Penalty Representation Project); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 40, at 375 (noting 
that the Baldus study, a famous study of death sentencing rates, suggests that jurors give 
special weight to statutory sentencing factors beyond the weight they would otherwise 
attach to the facts and circumstances underlying those factors) (citing DAVID C. BALDUS, 
GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 102-03 (1990)); Robert Weisberg, 
Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 352 (1983) (“A jury facing a difficult 
moral judgment on the basis of lots of raw evidence is likely to be somewhat affected by 
the idea that the legislature had placed a special imprimatur on the defendant’s criminal 
record . . . .”); Marcia A. Widder, Comment, Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme 
Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TUL. 
L. REV. 1341, 1368 & n.123 (1994) (arguing that it is “ludicrous to assume” a jury would 
only consider eligibility factors as relevant to the extent they made the defendant death-
eligible when, at the penalty stage, the jury was instructed to consider the eligibility 
factors it had found). 
 110. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“This 
conclusion [that the Constitution is more demanding in the context of death penalty 
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judicial economy, the questionable death sentence case is not it.111  
Therefore, while Scalia’s position is reasonably consistent with the 
court’s weighing–non-weighing precedent (though certainly not dictated 
by it),112 it falters in terms of logic and policy.113
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, brought us much closer to an 
acceptable approach.  Given the confusion surrounding the weighing–
non-weighing dichotomy, he rightly recommended an evisceration of 
this framework, at least in the sense that the constitutionality of a death 
sentence should not turn on a state’s classification as being either 
weighing or non-weighing.  From Breyer’s basic premise—that harmless 
error review or independent reweighing is necessary anytime a sentencer 
has relied to some degree on a subsequently invalidated sentencing 
cases] rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different 
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.  Death, in its finality, differs more from 
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. 
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case.”); accord Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985) (vacating death sentence 
due to proceeding’s inconsistency with Eighth Amendment’s “heightened ‘need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the  appropriate punishment’”) (quoting 
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977) (White, J., 
concurring) (concurring in the judgment on the ground that the death sentence 
proceeding did not comport with Woodson); cf. Kevin Michael Miller, Note, Romano v. 
Oklahoma: The Requirement of Jury’s Sense of Responsibility and Reliability in Capital 
Sentencing, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1307, 1328-30 (1995) (observing that since the early 
1980s, the Court has slowly moved away from its insistence on heightened reliability in 
capital decisions). 
 111. This is not to suggest that considerations of efficiency have absolutely no place 
in the context of death penalty decisions.  Rather, while notions of judicial economy are 
still relevant, they should figure only minimally into the overall calculus.  The Court 
recognized as much in Zant: “[A]lthough not every imperfection in the deliberative 
process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state court judgment, the 
severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of 
error.”  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). 
 112. In addition to the fact that Sanders was a five-four decision with both dissents 
criticizing the majority opinion as inconsistent with precedent, it should also be noted 
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision below was unanimous in reaching the opposite 
conclusion, which it felt was dictated by Supreme Court precedent.  Sanders v. 
Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004).  If these contradictory opinions are any 
indication, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s precedent on this issue is murky at best. 
 113. The upshot of Sanders is that reviewing courts will have an easier time 
upholding death penalty decisions partially based on erroneous sentencing factors.  See 
Filisko, supra note 109 (“‘The effect is that this opinion will make it somewhat easier for 
reviewing courts to uphold death sentences in cases where there was some kind of error 
in the way one of the aggravating circumstances was defined.’”) (quoting Joseph L. 
Hoffman, Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law).




factor114—we can extrapolate a solution that is clear and at the same 
time consistent with the policy of ensuring reliability in capital 
sentencing. 
The ideal approach would operate as follows: In a state where the 
eligibility factors play some role at the penalty stage, a death sentence 
rendered based on a subsequently invalidated eligibility factor will 
always require reversal unless it survives harmless error review or an 
independent reweighing minus the invalid factor.  On the other hand, in 
a sentencing scheme wherein the eligibility factors serve absolutely no 
function at the penalty stage, the invalidation of an eligibility factor 
subsequent to a death sentence leaves the sentence constitutional and not 
subject to harmless error review so long as the defendant would still be 
eligible for death in the absence of the invalidated eligibility factor.115  
This framework would ensure the reliability of death sentences in those 
instances where there is actual reason to suspect prejudice, yet would not 
require gratuitous review in those cases where there is no reason to have 
such fear. 
Applying this alternative approach to Sanders’s appeal, the sentence 
would have to be vacated unless the error was shown to be harmless.  
That is, because the invalidated eligibility factors (that “[t]he murder 
was committed while the defendant was engaged in . . . [b]urglary” and 
 114. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 896, 902 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115. Justice Breyer’s position may indeed be very close to this.  On the other hand, 
it may not.  It is difficult to tell whether Breyer argued for harmless error review all the 
time, regardless of a state’s sentencing regime, or whether he in fact would agree with 
this Note that harmless error review is unnecessary when eligibility factors serve 
absolutely no function at the penalty stage.  At first glance, Breyer’s approach seems to 
insist on harmless error review all the time: 
In my view, it does not matter whether California is a “weighing” or a 
“nonweighing” State, as ordinary rules of appellate review should apply.  A 
reviewing court must find that the jury’s consideration of an invalid factor was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the form a State’s death 
penalty law takes. 
Id. at 896.  However, given Breyer’s definition of weighing and non-weighing schemes, 
it is possible Breyer would agree that harmless error review need not be conducted when 
the invalidated factor was only considered at the eligibility stage.  Breyer defined 
weighing states as those in which the jury is instructed to weigh at the sentencing stage 
all mitigating factors against only the previously found eligibility factors.  Id. at 897.  He 
defined non-weighing states as those in which the jury is to weigh all mitigating factors 
against any and all aggravating factors, including, but not limited to, the previously 
found eligibility factors.  Id.  So defined, the solution advanced by this Note would 
likewise mandate that harmless error review always be conducted in both weighing and 
non-weighing schemes.  However, because Breyer never discussed the regime wherein 
the jury is to weigh at the sentencing stage the mitigating factors against a list of 
aggravating factors that is different from, and completely exclusive of, the invalidated 
eligibility factors, it is not clear whether Breyer would embrace this Note’s conclusion 
that harmless error review is unwarranted in such a situation. 
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that it was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”116) served a function 
at the penalty stage,117 a court could not presume that the jury would 
have chosen death in the absence of these factors.  Rather, a reviewing 
court would have to conduct harmless error review or an independent 
reweighing of the valid sentencing factors to determine if the death 
sentence could stand.118
In Sanders’s case it seems somewhat probable that the error was in 
fact harmless because: (1) the function served by the invalidated 
eligibility factors at the penalty stage was rather limited;119 and (2) a 
number of other applicable sentencing factors existed which the jury 
may have considered as warranting death.120  Under this alternative 
approach, a reviewing court would be cognizant of these dynamics when 
inquiring whether the error was harmless.121  Nevertheless, a court could 
not presume that the error was harmless as Scalia would have it,122 but 
rather would have to make a factual determination as to whether the 
error was actually harmless. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Brown v. Sanders decision is important far beyond its disposition 
of Sanders’s appeal.  By assuming that a jury’s reliance on invalid 
sentencing factors automatically represents harmless error in a broad 
range of cases, Justice Scalia assumed too much.  Not only is this 
position flawed as a matter of fact, it also conflicts with the Court’s 
 116. People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 587, 589 (Cal. 1990). 
 117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a) (West 1999); Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 888; see also 
supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 118. Of course, a jury could also perform this independent reweighing function. 
 119. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
 120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3.  These other applicable factors included, among 
other things, “the presence . . . of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the 
use . . . of force or violence.”  Id. 
 121. Justice Stevens acknowledged as much: 
If a jury is told that only those specific aggravating circumstances making the 
defendant eligible for the death penalty may provide reasons for imposing that 
penalty, its consideration of an invalid factor is obviously more prejudicial 
than if the jury is told that it may also consider all of the circumstances of the 
crime. The fact that California sentencing juries may consider these 
circumstances increases the likelihood that their consideration of a 
subsequently invalidated aggravating circumstance will be harmless, but it 
does not take California out of the ‘weighing State’ category. 
  Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 895 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 892; see also supra Part III.B. 




repeated commitment to the notion that death penalty cases require a 
heightened degree of reliability.123  As the lower courts take up this new 
rule, it will likely deprive numerous defendants of the right to a fair 
capital proceeding; within many sentencing schemes,124 it will allow 
courts to assume the sentencer’s consideration of invalidated eligibility 
factors was harmless without even reviewing the record to make this 
determination. 
The approach suggested by this Note provides a preferable alternative.  
In doing away with the murky framework that is the weighing–non-
weighing dichotomy, this alternative would offer courts clear guidance 
while at the same time ensuring that any real risk of prejudice does not 
go unchecked.  With so much at stake, the defendant in a capital case 
deserves no less. 
NICHOLAS A. FROMHERZ 
 
 123. The Court has recognized this greater need for reliability in a number of cases.  
See supra note 110; see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) (explaining 
that “the Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding [in 
capital cases]”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (reasoning that, “[b]ecause sentences of death are ‘qualitatively different’ 
from prison sentences, this court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure [the 
defendant is not prejudicially sentenced]”) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 305 (1976)); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“We are satisfied that 
this qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of 
reliability when the death sentence is imposed.”). 
 124. Scalia’s new rule is inapplicable to only two types of sentencing schemes: (1) 
pure weighing schemes (schemes wherein the only aggravating factors considered at the 
penalty stage are the eligibility factors found at the eligibility stage); and (2) non-
weighing schemes that do not possess an omnibus “circumstances of the crime” factor 
allowing the jury to consider the evidence implicated by the invalidated factor under the 
rubric of the valid “circumstances of the crime” catch-all.  See Sanders, 126 S. Ct. at 
892. 
